

HONORABLE THOMAS S. ZILLY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

JOANNA P. MATTSON, on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

MILLIMAN, INC.; THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS OF MILLIMAN, INC.; THE
MILLIMAN INVESTMENT COMMITTEE,
and its members; THE MILLIMAN INC. U.S.
RETIREMENT COMMITTEE, and its
members, Does 1-30,

Defendants.

NO. 2:22-cv-00037-TSZ

**DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT
OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS THE
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(6)**

**NOTED FOR HEARING:
December 2, 2022**

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS (2:22-CV-0037-TSZ)

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I. INTRODUCTION¹

The Court’s prior Order (Dkt. No. 43) (“Order”) expressly held that to plausibly allege an ERISA-based claim that the WPS Funds were not prudent investments, Ms. Mattson must first identify “meaningful benchmark[s]” for the WPS Funds, *i.e.*, benchmarks with “similar aims, risks, and potential rewards.” *Id.* at 2. In *Evans v. Associated Banc-Corporation*, No. 21-C-60, 2022 WL 4638092, at *7 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 30, 2022), a decision Ms. Mattson relies upon in her Opposition, the Eastern District of Wisconsin held that investment products with different asset allocations do not constitute “meaningful benchmark[s]” even though they were “from the same broad Morningstar category.” The court correctly reasoned that “funds that invest as little as 50% in equities (common stocks) and funds that invest as much as 70% in equities—a range of 20%—would be expected to have very different returns and levels of risk, depending on the performance of the equity markets.” *Id.* And, in *Matousek v. MidAmerican Energy Co.*, 51 F.4th 274, 282 (8th Cir. Oct. 12, 2022), the Eighth Circuit recently rejected an attempt to compare a fund with a “*value* strategy” to a fund with a “*growth* strategy,” finding that funds with “contrasting investment styles” were “just different” and “using either as a benchmark for the other would neither be ‘sound’ nor ‘meaningful.’”

Ms. Mattson’s comparisons of the WPS Funds to the Morningstar Indices, Dow Jones Indices and the Comparator Funds fail for the same reason that the comparisons in *Matousek* and *Evans* failed. As in *Matousek*, Ms. Mattson’s purported comparators do not follow similar investment strategies as the WPS Funds. The WPS Funds adhere to a managed volatility strategy, as was repeatedly disclosed to Plan participants who invested in the product. Ms. Mattson’s Opposition admits that the Morningstar Indices, the Dow Jones Indices and the Comparator Funds ***do not*** follow a similar investment strategy. Moreover, as in *Evans*, the

¹ This Reply incorporates the defined terms in Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Dkt. No. 47) (“Motion” or “Mot.”). Ms. Mattson’s Opposition (Dkt. No. 62) is referred to herein as the “Opposition” or “Opp.”

Morningstar Indices, Dow Jones Indices and Comparator Funds have far different asset allocations—and, as a result, different returns and levels of risk—than the WPS Funds. In sum, the two indices and the Comparator Funds are not the “‘apples to apples’ comparison” that the Court previously advised was required to plausibly give rise to a prudence claim. Order at 3.

Further, the FAC fails to plausibly allege that the WPS Funds “substantially underperformed” in comparison to their Custom Indices. The Fund Fact Sheets demonstrate that the WPS Funds have performed as expected and tracked the Custom Indices. Moreover, contrary to Ms. Mattson’s statement in her Opposition, the FAC only compares the WPS Funds’ performance to the Custom Indices over a *five-year* time period, which courts have repeatedly held is insufficient to give rise to an ERISA-based prudence claim.

As a result, Ms. Mattson’s second attempt through the FAC to plead an ERISA-based prudence claim fails.

II. ARGUMENT

A. The Morningstar Indices, the Dow Jones Indices and the Comparator Funds Are Not Meaningful Benchmarks for the WPS Funds.

The Morningstar Indices, Dow Jones Indices and Comparator Funds are not “meaningful benchmarks” for the WPS Funds. As a threshold matter, the Morningstar Indices, Dow Jones Indices and Comparator Funds follow fundamentally different investment strategies than the WPS Funds. A core component of the WPS Fund is its managed volatility strategy²—*i.e.*, the WPS Funds are affirmatively managed to specified volatility targets. *See* Mot. at 3-4. The WPS Funds manage volatility through the use of exchanged-traded futures contracts and other strategies to “hedge” against volatility. *See id.* This strategy was no secret. *Cf.* Opp. at 7. The

² Contrary to Ms. Mattson’s argument, *see* Opp. at 6, the Court did *not* hold that the WPS Funds are not managed volatility funds. In dismissing Ms. Mattson’s claims, the Court held that Ms. Mattson must “allege sufficient information with respect to her proposed benchmarks to establish an ‘apples-to-apples’ comparison” to the WPS Funds. Order at 3.

1 WPS Fund Fact Sheets³ expressly describe this strategy in *five* separate places. *See* Mot. Exs.
2 10-12.

3 Ms. Mattson's Opposition does not dispute, and thus concedes,⁴ that the Morningstar
4 Indices, the Dow Jones Indices and the Comparator Funds *do not* employ managed volatility
5 strategies. *See generally* Opp. Indeed, Ms. Mattson does not argue that these indices and
6 Comparator Funds are managed to specific volatility targets or that they manage volatility using
7 exchange traded funds. *See id.*

8 Despite the WPS Funds' clear and express strategy on managing volatility, Ms. Mattson
9 asks the Court to disregard this key feature of the WPS Funds and rule that all target risk funds
10 constitute meaningful benchmarks for one another. Ms. Mattson claims that "all target risk
11 funds, including the benchmarks, manage components of risk including volatility." Opp. at 7
12 n.2. But managing components of *risk* and managing a fund to meet a specified *volatility* target
13 are not the same thing. Ms. Mattson does not even attempt to argue otherwise. *See id.* at 7.

14 As discussed in greater detail below, in addition to having different investment strategies
15 than the WPS Fund, the Morningstar Indices, Dow Jones Indices and Comparator Funds also
16 have far different asset allocations. *See Evans*, 2022 WL 4638092, at *7; *Reetz v. Lowe's Cos.*
17 *Inc.*, No. 5:18-CV-75, 2021 WL 4771535, at *55 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 12, 2021) ("It is unsurprising
18

19 ³ Ms. Mattson incorrectly claims that the WPS Fund Fact Sheets are "pitch materials" that should
20 not be considered by the Court. *See* Opp. at 1, 4-6, 7. The WPS Fund Fact Sheets are prepared
21 quarterly to report the performance of the Funds to the Plan participants (including Ms. Mattson)
22 and others who *already invested* in WPS Funds. The frivolousness of Ms. Mattson's argument
23 is underscored by the fact that (i) the FAC specifically references the Fund Fact Sheets (*see*,
24 *e.g.*, ¶¶ FAC 68, 71, 82, 110, 121, 143) and (ii) Ms. Mattson attached the December 31, 2021
25 Fund Fact Sheets to her Opposition to Defendants' original Motion to Dismiss. *See* Dkt. No.
26 39, Ex. 2. Ms. Mattson does not contest the accuracy of the information or provide any further
reasoning for why they could not be considered at this stage. *Cf. Evans*, 2022 WL 4639082 at
*5 (declining to consider fund fact sheets where the accuracy of the information was disputed).

⁴ *See In re Metawave Commc'ns Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1090 (W.D. Wash.
2003) (Zilly, J.) (holding that failure to address an argument in opposition to a motion to dismiss
was "a concession that this argument constitutes a valid reason for dismissal").

1 that equities, or funds with greater concentrations in equity, would generate greater returns when
 2 equities are performing exceptionally well.”).

3 **a. Morningstar Indices.**

4 Ms. Mattson all but concedes that the Morningstar Indices are not “meaningful
 5 benchmarks” for the WPS Funds. *See* Opp. at 15-16.

6 Ms. Mattson’s Opposition does not dispute and, thus admits that, unlike the WPS Funds,
 7 the Morningstar Indices ***do not*** follow a managed volatility strategy. *Compare* Mot. at 3-5 with
 8 Opp. at 15-16. Further, Ms. Mattson’s Opposition does not dispute that the Morningstar Indices
 9 have materially different equity allocations than the WPS Funds. *Compare* Mot. at 3-5 with
 10 Opp. at 15-16. Ms. Mattson’s Opposition is entirely ***silent*** on this point, thereby conceding it.

11 As explained in the Motion, Ms. Mattson identified Morningstar Indices that are
 12 designed to benchmark the performance of funds that have materially ***higher*** equity allocations
 13 than the WPS Funds. For example, the WPS Conservative Fund, on average, has had a ***49.76%***
 14 equity allocation. *See* Mot. Ex. 10 at 2. Ms. Mattson, however, has identified the Morningstar
 15 Moderate Target Risk Index as a comparator for the WPS Conservative Fund (FAC ¶¶ 155-57),
 16 even though that index is designed to track funds with ***50-70%*** equity allocations. *See id.* ¶ 157.
 17 As the court concluded in *Evans*, an investment product like the WPS Conservative Fund that
 18 invests just under 50% of its assets in equities would be expected to have different results than
 19 a Morningstar index for funds that invest up to 70% in equities—a ***20-point spread***. 2022 WL
 20 4638092, at *7. As explained in the Motion, the spread between the equity allocations for the
 21 WPS Moderate Fund and WPS Growth Fund and the equity allocation for the Morningstar
 22 indices selected by Ms. Mattson are of similar magnitude.⁵

23 Evidently recognizing that the Morningstar Indices follow differently investment
 24 strategies and have materially different equity allocations than the WPS Funds, Ms. Mattson

25 _____
 26 ⁵ Ms. Mattson’s argument that the WPS Growth Fund “invest[s] over 85%” of its portfolio to
 equity securities, Opp. at 16, is misleading. *See infra* n.8.

1 relies on characteristics that are common to all target risk funds to argue that the Morningstar
 2 Indices are “meaningful benchmarks” for the WPS Funds. *See* Opp. at 16 (claiming that the
 3 “Morningstar Aggressive Target Risk Index was created to represent funds which ‘seek to
 4 provide both income and capital appreciation by investing in multiple asset classes, including
 5 stocks, bonds, and cash,’ which is also an accurate description of the Aggressive Fund’s aims”).
 6 Not only is Ms. Mattson’s argument wrong,⁶ these generic traits are insufficient to plausibly
 7 allege that the Morningstar Indices have the same aims, risks, and potential rewards as the WPS
 8 Funds. *See Anderson v. Intel Corp. Inv. Pol’y Comm.*, 579 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1152-53 (N.D.
 9 Cal. 2022) (holding that allegations that purported comparator funds “invest in global stocks
 10 and bonds” are insufficient to plausibly allege a “meaningful benchmark”).

11 **b. Dow Jones Indices.**

12 Ms. Mattson similarly admits that the Dow Jones Indices do not follow a managed
 13 volatility strategy. *Compare* Mot. at 3-5 with Opp. at 11-15. Ms. Mattson claims that the Dow
 14 Jones Indices are similar to the WPS Funds “in that they both target a given risk tolerance[.]”
 15 Opp. at 12. However, the same could be said of *any* target risk index.

16 Ms. Mattson is correct that by virtue of being a “target risk” index, the Dow Jones Indices
 17 track the performance of funds that manage risk. *See id.* But that does not mean that that the
 18 indices are managed to specified volatility targets or employ a hedging strategy. Far from a
 19 “factual fallacy” created by Milliman, Opp. at 13, the WPS Funds’ managed volatility and
 20 hedging strategies were described to Plan participants as a central component of the Funds’
 21 investment strategy. *See* Mot. Exs. 10-12. Comparable managed volatility and hedging
 22 strategies are notably absent from the “pre-set investment portfolios” whose performance the

24 ⁶ The aim of the WPS Growth Fund is not simply to “provide both income and capital
 25 appreciation by investing in multiple asset classes, including stocks, bonds, and cash[.]” Opp. at
 26 16. The aim of the WPS Growth Fund, as expressly stated in the Fund Fact Sheets, is to “provide
 capital growth and income *consistent with a volatility target* and its asset allocation.” Mot. Ex.
 12 at 4 (3/31/2016 WPS Growth Fund Fact Sheet) (emphasis added).

1 Dow Jones Indices measure. *See* Opp. at 13. Ms. Mattson’s assertion that the WPS Funds and
 2 the Dow Jones Indices both “target a given risk tolerance, primarily” through asset allocation,
 3 *see* Opp. at 12, ignores that the WPS Funds were managed to specified volatility targets. *See*
 4 Mot. Exs. 10-12.

5 Ms. Mattson also admits that the Dow Jones Indices also have different equity
 6 allocations than the WPS Funds. *See* Opp. at 12 (acknowledging that the WPS Funds and Dow
 7 Jones Indices had differences in equity allocations ranging up to 10%). Moreover, the Dow
 8 Jones Indices are inapt comparators for the WPS Funds because they are designed to track
 9 portfolios that invest in “*U.S. equities markets.*” FAC ¶ 146 (emphasis added). In contrast, each
 10 WPS Fund includes an international component in their equity allocations—often between 6
 11 and 13%. *See* Mot. Exs. 10-12, WPS Fund Fact Sheets (6.39-7.40% international equity
 12 allocation for the WPS Conservative Fund; 8.36-9.44% international equity allocation for the
 13 WPS Moderate Fund; and 10.50-12.53% international equity allocation for the WPS Growth
 14 Fund).

15 Because the WPS Funds follow a different investment strategy and have far different
 16 asset allocations than the Dow Jones Indices, Ms. Mattson resorts to arguing that the Dow Jones
 17 Indices are “meaningful benchmarks” for the WPS Funds because they are identified in the
 18 participant fee disclosures. Contrary to Ms. Mattson’s argument, the fact that the Dow Jones
 19 Indices are identified in the WPS Funds’ disclosures does not mean Milliman is “bound to this
 20 representation.” Opp. at 11-12 n.5. As explained in the Motion, the legal requirement to include
 21 an index in a participant fee disclosure does not necessarily make that same index a “meaningful
 22 benchmark” for purposes of assessing the prudence of a fiduciary’s decision to maintain a fund
 23 in a plan’s investment line up. *See* Mot. at 6 n.7; *see also Wilcox v. Georgetown Univ.*, No. 18-
 24 422, 2019 WL 132281, at *11 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2019) (rejecting argument that a market index
 25 identified in a participant fee disclosure was an appropriate benchmark because doing so would
 26

“oversimplif[y] and misstate[] the facts and governing law”). The Opposition offers no persuasive reason why the Court should not follow *Wilcox*.⁷

c. Comparator Funds

Ms. Mattson’s effort to compare the WPS Funds to particular target risk funds fares no better. Ms. Mattson claims that the Comparator Funds have comparable equity allocations to the WPS Funds, but her Opposition does not dispute, and thus admits, that certain of her purported “comparators” allocated as much as 10% more of their assets to equity than the WPS Funds. *See* Opp. at 16-18.⁸

Ms. Mattson also claims that the Comparator Funds are “meaningful benchmarks” for the WPS Funds because they “have the primary investment aim of achieving the highest total return consistent with the investor’s level of risk tolerance . . . , which includes managing the funds’ volatility.” Opp. at 16. The same can be said of *any* target risk fund. These generic statements do not establish that the Comparator Funds are “meaningful benchmarks” for the WPS Funds.

The WPS Funds’ aims are more focused and distinct than those of the target risk funds Ms. Mattson identifies as potential comparators. The WPS Funds seek to not only achieve a certain level of investment risk *but also* manage the extent to which the Funds’ value will fluctuate within a specified target. *See* Mot. at 5. As both the Eighth and Sixth Circuits have

⁷ The Court previously held that the Dow Jones Aggressive Target Risk Portfolio Index—which is identified in the participant fee disclosure as a benchmark for the WPS Growth and Moderate Funds—“appear[s] to be an inappropriate comparator for at least one of the funds at issue.” Order at 3 n.2. Following this guidance, Ms. Mattson has effectively conceded that the Dow Jones Aggressive Target Risk Portfolio Index is not a “meaningful benchmark” for the WPS Moderate Fund. *See* Opp. at 11-12 n.5.

⁸ Ms. Mattson’s claim that the WPS Growth Fund allocated 87% of its assets to equities, *see* Opp. at 17, is misleading. Ms. Mattson cherry-picks a single quarter where the equity allocation of the WPS Growth Fund reached 87%. *See* FAC ¶ 71 (alleging that the WPS Growth Fund allocated 87% to equities as of 12/31/2021). During the class period, the WPS Growth Fund *on average* allocated 84% of its assets to equity, and its equity allocation ranged from 75.86 % to 87.06%. *See* Mot. Ex. 12 at 2.

1 recently held, comparator funds with different investment styles and strategies are not
 2 “meaningful benchmarks.” *See Matousek*, 51 F.4th at 282 (rejecting comparisons between a
 3 fund with a “value strategy” to a fund with a “growth strategy”); *Smith v. CommonSpirit Health*,
 4 37 F.4th 1160, 1167 (6th Cir. 2022) (holding comparator funds were “inapt comparators”
 5 because “each fund has distinct goals and distinct strategies”). The contrasting investment styles
 6 of Ms. Mattson’s Comparator Funds, which seek only to match a certain level of risk tolerance,
 7 and the WPS Funds, which seek to manage volatility to specified targets, makes the Comparator
 8 Funds “just different.” *Matousek*, 51 F.4th at 282.

9 Ms. Mattson claims that the Comparator Funds are “meaningful benchmarks” for the
 10 WPS Funds because their historic volatility levels over the alleged class period are comparable
 11 to the WPS Funds’ volatility targets. *See Opp.* at 17-18. This observation made with the benefit
 12 of 20/20 hindsight does not save her claim from dismissal. When assessing a duty of prudence
 13 claim, courts “judge a fiduciary’s actions based on information available to the fiduciary ***at the***
 14 ***time of each investment decision*** and not from the vantage point of hindsight[.]” *Pension Ben.*
 15 *Guar. Corp. ex rel. St. Vincent Cath. Med. Ctrs. Ret. Plan v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Inc.*,
 16 712 F.3d 705, 716 (2d Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). The fact that Ms. Mattson’s Comparator
 17 Funds ultimately had volatility levels during the class period similar to those of the WPS Funds
 18 was not information available to Defendants at the time they made the decision to retain the
 19 WPS Funds in the Plan’s investment line up.⁹ It also does not follow that funds that were

21 ⁹ Similarly, a participant wishing to target a certain volatility level would not have known to
 22 select any of Ms. Mattson’s Comparator Funds because they do not list a volatility rate on their
 23 fact fund sheets. In contrast, the Milliman Plan offers a volatility-managed vehicle, which, in
 24 combination with other investment options, offers the opportunity to build an allocation of
 25 retirement investments tailored to each participant’s personal tolerance for risk and volatility.
 26 *See CommonSpirit*, 37 F.4th at 1167 (“Each person has a distinct risk profile[.]”). By
 challenging the WPS Funds as imprudent, Ms. Mattson is essentially arguing that the Plan was
 obligated to offer options with more volatility. The Plan’s decision to provide options with more
 conservative features does not state a breach of prudence claim “regardless of whether some
 perform better than others.” *Id.* at 1169.

1 *affirmatively* managed to specified volatility targets—such as the WPS Funds—and funds
 2 which, in hindsight, ultimately happened to have similar volatility levels—such as the
 3 Comparator Funds—followed a similar investment strategy. Accordingly, Ms. Mattson’s
 4 allegations regarding the historical volatility levels of the Comparator Funds do not plausibly
 5 allege that they are “meaningful benchmarks” for the WPS Funds.

6 ***

7 In sum, the WPS Funds employ a distinct investment strategy—the Funds were
 8 affirmatively managed to provide capital growth and income consistent with specified volatility
 9 targets and the Funds’ asset allocations. *See* Mot. Exs. 10-12. Comparing the performance of
 10 the WPS Funds to indices and funds that follow different investment strategies and have
 11 different asset allocations does not give rise to an inference that Defendants were imprudent
 12 when they decided to retain the WPS Funds as investment options in the Plan’s investment line
 13 up. Ms. Mattson’s comparison of “apples” and “oranges” does not plausibly allege a prudence
 14 claim.

15
 16 **B. Ms. Mattson Does Not Plausibly Allege That the WPS Funds Substantially Underperformed the Custom Indices.**

17 Ms. Mattson has not plausibly alleged that the WPS Funds *substantially* underperformed
 18 over a lengthy time period in comparison to the Custom Indices. Her comparisons to the Custom
 19 Indices accordingly fail to plausibly allege a prudence claim. *See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Northwell*
 20 *Health Inc.*, No. 20-cv-3256, 2022 WL 4639673, at *6-8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022) (granting
 21 motion to dismiss where the plaintiff failed to allege “consistent” and “substantial”
 22 underperformance).

23 Ms. Mattson argues that the WPS Funds “*in their first five years in the Plan* [i.e., 2013
 24 through 2017] significantly underperformed *all meaningful benchmarks.*” Opp. at 1 (emphasis
 25 added). The argument is unsupported by the allegations in the FAC, which only address the
 26

1 performance of the WPS Funds relative to the Custom Indices from January 1, 2016 through
 2 December 31, 2021. *See* FAC ¶¶ 190, 197, 204.¹⁰ As identified in the Motion, alleged
 3 underperformance over a five-year period is insufficient to plausibly allege a prudence claim.
 4 Mot. at 7 (discussing *CommonSpirit*, 37 F.4th at 1166-67). *See also* *Davis v. Salesforce.com,*
 5 *Inc.*, No. 20-cv-1753, 2020 WL 5893405, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2020) (“allegations based on
 6 five-year returns are not sufficiently long-term to state a plausible claim of imprudence”)
 7 (internal quotation marks omitted); *Dorman v. Charles Schwab Corp.*, No. 17-cv-285, 2019 WL
 8 580785, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2019) (characterizing five years of underperformance as
 9 “relatively short” and insufficient to support claim that funds “persistent[ly] or materially”
 10 underperformed); *Wehner v. Genentech Inc.*, No. 20-cv-6894, 2021 WL 507599, at *9 (N.D.
 11 Cal. Feb. 9, 2021) (underperformance based on annual returns over three- and five-year periods
 12 insufficient to plausibly allege a prudence claim).¹¹

13 Ms. Mattson cites to *Henderson v. Emory University*, 252 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1351 (N.D.
 14 Ga. 2017) to support her claim that “[c]ourts have found pleading sufficient to defeat a motion
 15 to dismiss where a plaintiff alleged underperformance relative to a range of comparators over
 16 long periods of time.” Opp. at 10-11. However, in *Henderson*, the plaintiff alleged
 17 underperformance over one-, five- and ten-year periods. 252 F. Supp. 3d at 1351. Ms.
 18 Mattson’s citation to *Snyder v. United Health Group, Inc.*, Opp. at 9, is equally unpersuasive.

20 ¹⁰ The Opposition also makes no reference to the WPS Funds’ performance relative to the
 21 Custom Indices prior to January 1, 2016. *See* Opp. at 8-11. By contrast, Ms. Mattson alleges
 22 that the WPS Funds underperformed in comparison to the Morningstar Indices, the Dow Jones
 23 Indices and the Comparator Funds over a nearly 10-year time period, *i.e.*, from January 1, 2013
 (the date the investments were introduced to the Plan) through December 31, 2021. *See* FAC
 ¶¶ 188, 190, 195, 197, 202, 204; *see also* Opp. at 12, 18.

24 ¹¹ Ms. Mattson incorrectly argues that *Genentech* is inapposite because it addressed comparisons
 25 between actively and passively-managed funds. *See* Opp. at 20. The *Genentech* court explicitly
 26 held that the plaintiff failed to state an imprudence claim predicated on defendants’ retention of
 the challenged funds based on alleged underperformance based on annual returns over three-
 and five- year periods. *See* 2021 WL 507599, at *9.

1 The plaintiff in *Snyder* alleged underperformance “over the course of, not only the Class Period,
2 but eleven years in total.” No. CV 21-1049, 2021 WL 5745852, at *3 (D. Minn. Dec. 2, 2021).

3 Even looking at a five-year history, all three of the WPS Funds reported annualized
4 returns were better than or within 0.80 percent of the Custom Indices. *See* Mot. at 9-11. This
5 “small disparity in performance relative to its benchmark does not support the inference that
6 [d]efendants were imprudent” to retain the WPS Funds. *Patterson v. Morgan Stanley*, No. 16-
7 cv-6568, 2019 WL 4934834, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2019); *see also Cho v. Prudential Ins.*
8 *Co. of Am.*, No. 19-19886, 2021 WL 4438186, at *9-10 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2021) (granting motion
9 to dismiss where the plaintiff “admit[ted] that on several occasions the relevant funds
10 outperformed their benchmarks” and only underperformed between 0.07% and 3.71%); *Birse v.*
11 *CenturyLink, Inc.*, No. 17-cv-2872, 2019 WL 1292861, at *5 (D. Colo. Mar. 20, 2019) (holding
12 that “relative underperformance is insufficient to state a breach of fiduciary duty claim”); *White*
13 *v. Chevron Corp.*, No. 16-cv-793, 2016 WL 4502808, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2016)
14 (allegations that a fund’s price dropped 2-6% in a six-year period did not state a claim for breach
15 of fiduciary duty).

16 Moreover, as previously explained, the WPS Funds’ strategy has been highly effective
17 in protecting participants’ retirement savings, including in the highly volatile markets in 2019
18 and 2022. *See* Mot. at 9-11.¹² Ms. Mattson’s comparison of the cumulative performance of the
19 WPS Funds to the Custom Indices from the beginning to the end of class period, *see* Opp. at 9,
20 incorrectly assumes that Plan participants were locked into investing in the WPS Funds during

21 ¹² Ms. Mattson’s argument that the Court should not consider the September 30, 2022 WPS
22 Fund Fact Sheets, *see* Opp. at 5, is a transparent attempt to exclude updated performance data
23 that undercuts her claims. The class period for Ms. Mattson’s claims is January 13, 2016 “to
24 the date of judgment,” FAC ¶ 16—making updated performance data relevant to the disposition
25 of her claims. *See CommonSpirit*, 37 F.4th 16 1168 (“The district court fairly considered the
26 more recent data because it was central to [the plaintiff’s] claim, publicly available, and
judicially noticeable.”). The September 30, 2022 Fund Facts Sheets demonstrate that, over the
prior five-year period, the WPS Funds performed within 2.62% of their Custom Indices. *See*
Mot. Exs. 13-15.

1 the entire class period and could not change their investments, which is not how 401(k) plans
 2 operate. Plan participants could move their money into and out of the WPS Funds at any time
 3 based on, among other things, their personal views of what was happening in the economy and
 4 the markets and, in light of those views, whether a managed volatility strategy was a strategy
 5 they wanted to follow at that time. There is no dispute that, during the class period, the WPS
 6 Funds preserved the capital investments made by participants who made the decision to invest
 7 in the WPS Funds, especially in periods of market volatility. Ms. Mattson's theory of the case
 8 would deprive participants of the option to invest in the WPS Funds at any time by requiring
 9 Defendants to remove the WPS Funds from the Plan's investment line up as of January 1, 2016.

10 Finally, Ms. Mattson argues "it is telling that none of the Custom Indices focuses on
 11 volatility" and the Custom Indices "do not use hedging strategies or exchange traded future
 12 contracts and are not 'managed volatility' benchmarks." Opp. at 7, 9. Even if true, the point is
 13 irrelevant. It is undisputed that the investment manager for the WPS Funds (American Trust
 14 f/k/a Unified Trust) selected the Custom Indices as a reference point. It would have been
 15 disingenuous for anyone to argue that, having been selected by the investment manager, the
 16 Custom Indices are not a relevant data point. The comparison of the WPS Funds to that data
 17 point confirms that the WPS Funds did not substantially underperform the Custom Indices.

18 At most Ms. Mattson has identified certain periods in which the WPS Funds delivered
 19 slightly lower returns than the Custom Indices. Her allegations do not plausibly establish
 20 substantial underperformance compared to a meaningful benchmark.

21 **III. CONCLUSION**

22 For the reasons stated above, Milliman respectfully requests that the prudence and
 23 monitoring claims in Counts I and II of the First Amended Complaint be dismissed with
 24 prejudice.

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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on December 2, 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing document entitled with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following registered participants:

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